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COMMENTARY
THE UNCONSCIONABILITY BUSINESS - A COMMENT ON
TILDEN RENT-A-CAR CO. v. CLENDENNING'

The doctrine of unconscionability is developing apace, 2 and
while it may not yet be big business, it is making a decent living. It
is the purpose of this brief comment to suggest, by examining one
recent unconscionability decision, that the doctrine is a very crude
and imperfect device for regulating unfair terms in standard form
contracts. 3 Like "consideration" or "fundamental breach", unconscionability can be uttered very quickly 4 and it therefore gives one
the illusion that it is a concept which can easily be used.
The sad fact is that, just as consideration performs an indifferent job in deciding which promises should be enforced, 5 so does
unconscionability serve as a poor device for regulating unfair provisions in standard form contracts. 6
' (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400, 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.).
2 See, in addition to the present case, e.g., Pridmore v. Calvert (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 133
(B.C.S.C.); McKenzie v. Bank of Montreal (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 641, 7 O.R. (2d) 521
(H.C.J.), affd 70 D.L.R. (3d) 113, 12 O.R. (2d) 719 (C.A.); Black v. Wilcox (1976), 70
D.L.R. (3d) 192, 12 O.R. (2d) 759 (C.A.): Davidson v. Three Spruces Really Co. (1977), 79
D.L.R. (3d) 481, [1977] 4 W.W.R. 460 (B.C.S.C.). It is significant that the common law
doctrine is wider than the statutory codification of unconscionability in the provincial
Business Practices Acts. What price, statutory obsolescence?
3 In this comment, I have drawn very heavily from the ideas of Professor Leff. See, in particular, "Contract as Thing", 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131 (1970) and "Unconscionability and the
Crowd - Consumers and the Common Law Tradition", 31 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 349 (1970).
My excuse for restating Lefi's ideas is that I am a great believer in the dictum (attributed
to Mr. Justice Holmes) that we need education in the obvious more than we need elucidation of the obscure.
4 Note, in this connection, Professor Paul Freund's comments about the "clear and present
danger" test in determining what is permissible speech under the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Freund writes, "No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and
present danger', or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the
weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain
is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must
disentangle": The Supreme Court of the United States (Meridian Books, 1961), p. 4 4.
5 See, in particular, the criticisms in recent years by Atiyah, Consideration in Contracts: A
Fundamental Restatement (Canberra, 1971); Swan, "Consideration and the Reasons for
Enforcing Contracts", 15 U.W.O.L. Rev. 83 (1976): Reiter, "Courts, Consideration and
Common Sense", 27 U.T.L.J. 439 (1977).
6 Even Professor Posner concedes, by a circuitous route, that there are unfair provisions in
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It is the purpose of this brief comment to suggest that we should
regulate standard form contracts which are commonly used by
consumers by adopting mandatory statutory terms and conditions. These conditions would serve to protect the legitimate interests of the seller (or provider of services) as well as providing minimum protection for the buyer. I will try to show that the
unconscionability doctrine (as exemplified by the decision in the
present case) achieves neither of these goals.
What Does the Case Decide?
In common with most unconscionability decisions, it is possible
to say who won in Clendenning but it is impossible to derive any
guidance for cases which are even slightly different from the facts
in the present case.
Mr. Clendenning, the defendant, rented a motor vehicle from
the plaintiff, and elected to pay an additional premium for
"collision damage waiver" which he understood to amount to full
insurance against damage to the vehicle, having been told on previous occasions that the waiver provided "full non-deductible
coverage". On the face of the document it was provided that the
defendant was not entitled to protection, if he drove the car in violation of any of the provisions of the agreement, and on the back
of the agreement there were a number of terrifying exclusions7 including one which deprived the hirer of protection if he drank any
intoxicating liquor "whatever be the quantity". The defendant
consumed some alcohol and damaged the car. The plaintiff then
sued to recover the damage to the car.
The trial judge held for the defendant on the basis that the
standard form contracts. After pointing out that competition deals adequately with the
problem of the unfair provision, Posner states: "An occasional feature of printed contracts that is objectionable is the use of fine print to slip an onerous provision past an unwary customer"; see his Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd ed. (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1977), p. 85. Posner would regulate these provisions by deeming them to be fraudulent.
Since this technique involves the use of a fiction for no understandable reason, I shall
continue talking about unfair provisions.
7 As Mr. Justice Dubin pointed out in his majority opinion: "It is to be noted, for example,
that if the driver of the vehicle exceeded the speed-limit even by one mile per hour, or
parked the vehicle in a no-parking area, or even had one glass of wine or one bottle of
beer, the contract purports to make the hirer completely responsible for all damage to the
vehicle. Indeed, if the vehicle at the time of damage to it was being driven off a federal,
provincial or municipal highway, such as a shopping plaza for instance, the hirer purportedly would be responsible for all damages to the vehicle": 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400 at p. 403, 18
O.R. (2d) 601 at p. 603.
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plaintiff had misrepresented the terms of the contract to the defendant. The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Dubin and
Zuber, JJ.A.) were unable to find any misrepresentation by the
plaintiff's clerk, but they found for the defendant on the ground
that the plaintiff could not enforce the contract since the plaintiff
had not pointed out certain unusual and onerous (i.e., unconscionable) provisions to the defendant. Mr. Justice Lacourciere dissented because, although he thought that the terms of the contract
were harsh, he did not think it was unconscionable to deny protection to someone who had been driving when "the proportion of alcohol in his [the defendant's] blood exceeded the penal limit"' and
when "on the advice of counsel he pleaded guilty to a charge of
impaired driving". 9
It is at this point that the questions come rushing at one.
If the basis of the majority's decision really is the failure of the
plaintiff to point out onerous terms, then one would expect a different result if the plaintiff's clerk had told the defendant to read
the conditions on the back of the contract before signing the contract. One cannot be sure of this, but I would imagine that the
present majority would still have reached the same result. The
opinion might state that disclosure meant "real" disclosure and
merely asking someone to study the terms of the contract did not
amount to "real" disclosure since laymen could not be expected to
absorb complex provisions of standard from contracts.
Assume, now, that instead of asking the defendant to study the
printed terms and conditions, the plaintiff's clerk had told the defendant that he (the defendant) would not be entitled to protection if he consumed any intoxicating liquor. Again, it is impossible
to predict the result, but one suspects that the majority would
have held that the defendant would have understood this communication as meaning that if he (the defendant) drove while he was
unable to control the car as a result of being intoxicated, the plaintiff would be able to recover for damage to the car.
In short, all the court's talk about the need to point out unreasonable and unfair terms is probably beside the point. However,
even if the present majority uses disclosure as a smokescreen for
their decision, there is no guarantee that other judges will see this.
One senses that the result in the present case would have been
8Ibid.,at p. 410 D.L.R., p. 611 O.R.
9Ibid.
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different if the trial judge had found that the defendant was unable to control the vehicle because of intoxication. The question
that then arises is why the court did not state this. The answer, of
course, is that the common law tradition works by indirection and
by "case-to-case sniping".' 0 The majority, rightly, felt it did not
have the mandate to formulate a legislative rule. The question of
what protection (if any) we want to give to people who damage
cars as a result of drunken or reckless driving is a political one and
it is one that should therefore be made by politicians. That point
has been grasped in the area of tax discounting, an area in which
there was at least one unconscionability precedent." I am not suggesting statutory standard form contracts for every single contractual transaction; there is no need, for example, to have a-statutory
contract dealing with alcoholics selling their property at gross undervalue, although that has been the subject of at least one reported case.' 2 I am also not opposed to using unconscionability as
a means of striking out unfair provisions in standard form contracts, provided this device is recognized as being the poor second
best that it is.
A Statutory Car Rental Contract
I shall resist the temptation of drafting a statutory car rental
contract. I will do this because, like the judiciary, I know very little about the car rental business. Instead, I will set out the procedure that I think should be followed in drawing one up and an
outline of what should be included in the contract. To deal with
the procedure first: the Minister of Corporate and C9nsumer
Affairs should consult with the car rental companies, insurance
companies, Superintendent of Insurance and consumer organizations with a view to devising a statutory standard form contract.
The contract should state all the disqualifying conditions with as
much precision as possible; thus, if drunkenness is to be an ex10See

Leff, "Unconscionability and the Crowd - Consumers and The Common Law
Tradition", 31 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 349 (1970), at p. 358.

11See Hanson, Directorof Trade Practices v. John's Tax Service Ltd (B.C.S.C.), March 5,

1975, unreported. A number of legislative responses have been adopted in order to deal
with the tax discounting problem with outright prohibition (e.g., Quebec) at one extreme
to disclosure legislation at the other (Alberta). In between these two extremes, the Federal Tax Rebate Discounting Act, S.C. 1977-78, c. 25, limits the amount the discounter can

keep to 85%.
12See Black v. Wilcox (1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 192, 12 O.R. (2d) 759 (C.A.). This kind of case

is unusual and freakish enough for a "tailor-made" solution to be entirely appropriate.

Commentary

197

cluded risk, drunkenness should be. defined as precisely as possible. A disqualification which depended on the proportion of alcohol in a driver's blood 3 would be better than one that depended
on the trial judge's finding of whether the hirer was sufficiently impaired or not. Similarly, if a disqualification is to be made for driving at "an illegal, reckless or otherwise abusive speed",' 14 that
speed should be quantified. If there is to be a deductible provision,
the size of the deductible should be regulated.
Two arguments can be made against a statutory contract. In the
first place, it might be argued that the resulting statutory contract
will be an unhappy compromise between the interests of the car
rental companies and consumers. This is likely to be true, but it is
also true of every piece of legislation on the statute books. A statutory rental contract makes private legislation that previously was
invisible and uncertain, 5 visible and less uncertain.
The second fear that might be expressed is that a statutory standard form contract would merely restate the present horrific
contract already used by car rental companies. This is a possibility
but an exceedingly remote one. For one thing, it is difficult to believe that the executives of car rental companies will fight desperately to retain some of the clauses that presently appear in car
rental contracts. Second, it would be a foolhardy Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs who would merely rubber-stamp the
present car rental contracts. Experience with administrative control over insurance contracts shows that while it is difficult to
counter "the significant role of industry representatives in drafting
standard policies", 16 some obnoxious clauses are removed. 7 Further, those who are afraid of codifying contract terms, fail to take
into account that we already have unfair contract terms. It is true
that some of these unfair clauses can be successfully challenged
13Thus, I am attracted by Mr. Justice Lacourciere's definition of drunkenness rather than
the majority's definition. See text at footnotes 8, 9, supra, at p. 195.
14See cl. 7(g) of the rental agreement cited in Mr. Justice Lacourciere's dissenting opinion:
83 D.L.R. (3d) 400 at p. 414, 16 O.R. (2d) 601 at p. 614.
15For a description of standard form contracts as being tantamount to an exercise of legislative power, see e.g., Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract", 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943).
16See Kimball and Pfenningstorf, "Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice", 39 Indiana
L.J. 674 (1964), at pp. 704, 729.
17See Kimball and Pfenningstorf, "Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study", 40 Indiana L.J. 143 (1965).

198

Canadian Business Law Journal

but the consumer does not know which clauses will be held to be
unfair and few will have the resources and tenacity of a Mr. Clendenning to pursue a challenge to the fairness of a particular clause
up to the highest court in the land."8
Conclusion
It is very seldom that the interests of sellers (and providers of
services) and consumers coincide. It is my belief that both would
benefit from having a statutory form contract. Sellers would be assured that their legitimate interests were protected and consumers
would be assured of a minimum level of protection at very low
cost. Judges would also benefit from a movement to statutory contracts. They would be relieved of the thankless task of having to
make difficult policy judgments in situations where the relevant
evidence necessary to make an informed judgment is
unavailable.1 9 Practising lawyers would lose very little by the
adoption of statutory form contracts, since there are more lucrative fields of law than consumer litigation. Academic commentators might well be the principal losers if we moved from the present system of "catch-as-catch-can" to a more rational system of
controlling private economic power. But this seems a small price
to pay. Anyway, it is not much fun criticizing judges for failing to
achieve impossible goals.
Reuben Hasson*
CAN CONTRACT DAMAGES BASED ON WASTED
EXPENSES GIVE THE PLAINTIFF MORE THAN
THE VALUE OF THE PROMISED PERFORMANCE?
More than 40 years have passed since Fuller and Perdue distinguished three principal purposes which may be pursued in awarding contract damages.' Even before they wrote their influential arIs One does not have to be endowed with prophetic powers to see that the present case will

make its way to the Supreme Court of Canada.
19Thus, in the present case, one has no idea of very basic information about the car rental
business such as (a) how many companies there are in operation, and (b) how many companies self-insure. It seems to me that basic information of this kind ought to be available before a public body (whether court or Legislature) begins to make hard policy
decisions.
° Of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
Fuller and Perdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages", 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936).

